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ABSTRACT 
 The composition of the Marine infantry company is changing to meet new threats. 
How will these evolutions affect the lethality, survivability, and employment of the future 
force? This research uses agent-based combat modeling techniques to provide insights for 
future live-force experimentation and wargaming. The author uses modeling software to 
simulate different infantry company configurations based upon Force Design 2030 
proposals. The modeled scenario envisions a future Marine infantry company defending 
the flank of an expeditionary advanced base against a peer adversary conducting an 
amphibious assault. This research examines the size of the company engagement area and 
the implications of new and emerging technologies, such as loitering precision munitions, 
on the lethality and survivability of the infantry company. The author identifies the most 
effective tactics, techniques, and procedures discovered in the model. Based on 44,500 
simulated battles, this research finds that in a conventional company-sized engagement, 
the force that finds and delivers sufficient loitering munitions to the other side first most 
often generates victory. This phenomenon can be understood in the context of a 
company’s “throw weight,” or the number of munitions it can use per salvo to engage 
enemy forces. The investigation also concludes that the future battlefield will be highly 
lethal, with all sides expected to experience significant attrition, even in victory. 
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The character of war is rapidly changing. The emergence of new technologies based 
upon advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, and energy storage enables precision, 
innovative platforms, such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), optimized for attack, 
reconnaissance, and other functions. In addition to new technologies, geopolitical tensions 
in the western Pacific region are driving a realignment of the Department of Defense in 
accordance with new national strategic priorities. As a result of these trends, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps published planning guidance in 2019 that initiated Force 
Design 2030. The force design review targets 2030 as the year the future force must be 
prepared to conduct combat operations. The envisioned future formation will operate 
within enemy weapon engagement zones as part of expeditionary advanced base 
operations.  
The implications of the force design review at the small unit level are many. Marine 
infantry companies will see the most significant changes to force structure in decades if 
current proposals are accepted. These modifications promise to increase Marine lethality 
and survivability on future battlefields. Proposed changes fall into two categories: changes 
to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and changes to equipment. Operational 
necessities will govern these two sets of changes as commanders seek to generate victory. 
At the Marine infantry company level, two critical questions emerge. 
1. How might a future company commander best design their engagement 
area? 
2. How much ordnance and of what type will a company require to engage 
an enemy force of a given size and type? 
By answering these two questions at the company level, commanders can better 
prepare their forces for the future battlefield filled with loitering munitions, anti-ship 
missiles, and other factors yet to be invented. 
To examine the two research questions, the author employed Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata Version V agent-based combat modeling and simulation software to 
xvi 
create a stochastic model of a Marine infantry company defense against a supported enemy 
amphibious mechanized company. The combat modeling process used an iterative, first-
principles approach to first simulate the future Marine fireteam, and then scale the model 
to simulate an entire Marine infantry company with organic precision fires (OPF) loitering 
munitions. The combat model included two different OPF systems: OPF 1 class 1, an anti-
personnel loitering munition, and OPF 1 class 2, an anti-armor loitering munition. The 
success of these two systems is key to the Commandant’s vision of distributed operations 
at the small unit level—as they enable the massing of fires without the massing of Marines. 
The author used both current and proposed system specifications to build OPF model 
agents.  
The red force in the model is based on the People’s Liberation Army Navy-Marine 
Corps (PLAN-MC). The red force primary maneuver unit is an amphibious mechanized 
infantry company mounted in ZBD-05s. The red force company is modeled with both 
attack UAS support and naval surface fire support from higher-level naval assets. In the 
scenario, the red force seeks to seize key maritime terrain to set conditions for the 
destruction of a Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). The blue force seeks to control that piece 
of key maritime terrain to prevent red force interference with MLR operations. 
After model completion, the author created robust designs of experiments using 
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercubes, resolution V fractional factorial, and full factorial 
designs. The design of experiments enabled efficient model replications using high 
performance cluster computing. During experimentation and data collection, 44,500 
different battles were simulated over several days, varying critical factors, such as 
probabilities of kill for OPF loitering munitions and communication latencies within the 
Marine kill web. Overall, the research design explores nine crucial factors, including OPF 
swarm size and blue force engagement distances. 
Key recommendations from the research include: 
1. To successfully conduct distributed operations, a Marine infantry 
company must have sufficient numbers of loitering munitions, no less than 
xvii 
10 OPF 1 class 2 systems, if relying solely on organic combat power to 
generate victory against a company-sized mechanized force. 
2. Victory is best generated by the force that first finds and employs 
sufficient loitering munitions on the other side. Therefore, the future 
Marine infantry company must operate under a permissive fire support 
control methodology that enables OPF employment within its area of 
operations. The author recommends a restricted operations zone where the 
future company commander owns airspace to a sufficient altitude and can 
self-clear all fires in his domain.  
3. High attrition is probable on the future battlefield if both sides employ 
precision loitering munitions. In the simulated battles that resulted in the 
blue force winning, the Marine infantry company, in particular 
instantiations, still took over 30% casualties. Future commanders must 
prepare themselves for this possibility and not let the enemy gain 
advantage by exploiting the resultant human factors in combat. 
4. HAW-MAW-LAW is superior to mass surprised fires at the company 
level. This research found that ZBD-05s moving at three to five knots 
through the surf are highly vulnerable to OPF. Marine company 
commanders should seek to induce friction in the enemy system by 
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Force Design is my number one priority. 
—38th Commandant 
A. THE COMMANDANT’S MAIN EFFORT 
The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) calls for the realignment of the 
Marine Corps to its naval roots (Berger 2019). The refocusing of operational efforts to the 
Pacific Theater and designation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as the main 
effort signals the opportunity for innovation. This innovation requires robust 
experimentation and wargaming to ensure timely, effective, and risk-worthy changes to the 
force.  
B. THE PROBLEM 
Many authors have written about the future operational environment in the Marine 
Corps Gazette and other publications over the past two years. In a 2019 article, Major 
General Mullen stated, “As the operating environment we face continues to change at what 
often seems like breakneck pace, the challenges will become increasingly complex. Many 
of these challenges are what is referred to as ‘wicked problems’ in that they do not have a 
solution” (Mullen 2019, p. 2). Furthermore, a renewed focus on great power competition 
against peer and near-peer competitors and realignment from the small wars of the early 
21st century is taking place (Cuomo et al. 2019). The future battlefield will likely be 
characterized by great dispersion between units, precision loitering munitions, and 
numerous unmanned vehicles in the air, on land, and in the sea. These new and emerging 
technologies are forecasted to change the tempo and lethality of war. 
The Commandant envisions a modern battlefield where the Marine Corps and Navy 
are capable of multiple concepts of employment under an umbrella operational paradigm 
(Berger 2019). The three main concepts of employment are distributed maritime operations 
(DMO), littoral operations in a contested environment (LOCE), and expeditionary 
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advanced basing operations (EABO). All three operations nest within the greater naval 
forces distributed operations (DO) concept, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Distributed Operational Concepts 
The importance of these concepts is captured in the Chief of Naval Operations’ first 
fragmentary order (FRAGO) of 2019. In his end state of the FRAGO, Admiral Gilday 
stated, “In order to maintain the maritime competitive advantage envisioned in our fleet 
design, we will ensure the wholeness of combat capable and lethal forces maximizing the 
benefits of Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, 
and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment” (Gilday 2019, p. 6). 
No one definition exists for distributed operations. Rather, it is a collection of 
different concepts across the joint force with similar or complementary characteristics. 
These characteristics align with the overarching theme of trading efficiency for 
survivability and increasing the distribution of forces across the battlespace to counter anti-
area access denial (A2AD) capabilities of near-peer or peer competitors (Priebe et al. 
2019). The concept of DMO integrates naval composite warfare concepts and leverages 
Marine Corps EABO to support the fleet’s operational maneuver from the sea (Kerg, 
Dmochowski, and Hanacek 2019).  
According to the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook,  
EABO is a future naval operational concept that meets the resiliency and 
forward presence requirements of the next paradigm of U.S. Joint 













and advantage-focused. The EABO concept is designed to defeat adversary 
attempts to execute counter intervention and fait accompli strategies that 
might otherwise inhibit a credible U.S. response to aggression against treaty 
allies and economic partners. (Corbett 2018, p. 5) 
The handbook notes that “EABO is incorporated within LOCE, and is aligned with, 
and supports DMO and the Fleet Design initiative” (Corbett 2018, p. 22). The fusion of 
DMO with EABO conceptionally support each other to enable LOCE within the ever-
expanding weapon engagement zone (WEZ) of potential adversaries. In aggregate, these 
concepts seek to mass fires without massing forces, thereby enabling lethality without 
exposing friendly forces to undue risk from enemy fires (Kerg, Dmochowski, and Hanacek 
2019). In the photo below, multi-launch rocket systems displace from an airfield as part of 
an expeditionary exercise (Gosun 2021).  
 
Photo courtesy of Lance Corporal Ujian Gosun 
Figure 2. Exercise Castaway 21.1 
Since before 2013, policy researchers envisioned a future where the Marine Corps 
employs land-based anti-ship missiles to complement naval operational maneuver from the 
sea (Kelly et al. 2013). The development of intermediate range anti-ship missiles in many 
national arsenals provides an opportunity to gain offensive striking power from an 
operationally defensive position. To understand missile warfare, an understanding of 
Hughes’ salvo equations is vital (Hughes and Girrier 2018). Quantitative analysis provides 
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insights into important factors such as quantity and quality tradeoffs. Hughes illustrates 
Admiral Nelson’s adage that “a ship is a fool to fight a fort” (Hughes and Girrier 2018). 
This concept aligns with the Marine Corps effort to create mobile defensive positions with 
EABO and the enhanced striking power of ASMs to deter and defeat enemy aggression. 
Hughes and Girrier (2018) posit that to defeat a fort a naval force must either attack a 
lightly defended position or completely isolate the position being assaulted to prevent 
mutual aid from adjacent forces.  
In a future conflict, enemy forces may seek to locate and destroy EABs with their 
strike capabilities. If the enemy cannot accomplish this due to the survivability of friendly 
EABs, an enemy force may conduct an amphibious assault with a counter lodgment force 
to isolate and reclaim key maritime terrain. EABs then must be able to defend themselves 
from these counter-lodgment forces. Suppose an EAB defends a critical and strategic piece 
of key maritime terrain, such as the Straits of Malacca. In that case, the enemy may deem 
its destruction vital to a greater naval campaign and devote large amounts of combat power 
to the EABs destruction. 
The implications of these developing operational concepts for the individual 
Marine infantryman are enormous. In the past two decades, the Marine Corps has focused 
on counter-insurgency and small wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued 
deployment of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). MEUs are “a forward-deployed, 
flexible, sea-based force that provides the President and the geographic combatant 
commander (GCC) with credible deterrence and decision time across the range of military 
operations” (DOD 2018, p. XI). While the Marine Corps will continue to deploy MEUs to 
support geographic combatant commanders, the structure and requirements of MEUs will 
change to meet the new operational paradigm. In addition to the MEU, the Marine Corps 
will composite a new formation called the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). The MLR is 
an organization optimized to persist within a WEZ. The proposed MLR will combine anti-
surface, anti-air, expeditionary logistics, and highly mobile infantry capabilities to deter 
enemy aggression. MLRs provide a credible threat to enemy forces in closed littoral 
environments should future enemies seek to engage them (Berger 2019). From an infantry 
standpoint, this is a significant paradigm shift from closing with an objective in a 
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mechanized assault to providing highly flexible fixed and mobile security for assets 
controlled by the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). The future 
center of gravity for the MLR is the anti-ship missile and its mission “naval strike.” Its 
mission is not the traditional combined arms assault of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) (Hegmann 2020). In this new paradigm with great uncertainty, how might the 
future Marine infantry company operate to best add value to the Joint Force? 
While these concepts establish a framework for future operations, the specific 
techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) enabled by new and emerging technologies 
remain to be conceived, tested, and codified in a product consumable by future infantry 
company commanders. Many questions arise in examining the problem sets of the future 
operating environment. With such a rapidly changing character of war, it is difficult to 
predict what emergent properties will grow from new and emerging technologies and force 
structure.  
Some broad age-old questions guide this research. The first question a commander 
may ask themselves in the defense is, “where will I kill the enemy?” The answer to this 
question defines where and how a company constructs an engagement area. The size and 
concept of operations for a given engagement area depend on the size of the defending unit, 
the type and amount of ordnance that unit has, and other supporting arms available to it. 
Unmanned systems and artificial intelligence (AI) are changing the character of 
engagement areas. New loitering munitions extend the reach of smaller and smaller 
echelons of warriors as miniaturization, and inexpensive manufacturing techniques 
continue to place more lethality in smaller packages. A commander in the future will be 
able to gain more standoff from their engagement area and greater organic precision in 
their unit, as they will be able to target faster and more accurately at greater distances using 
new platforms (Brose 2020).  
The second question a commander may ask themselves is “how much ordnance and 
of what type do I need to win?” The answers to this question are varied and situationally 
dependent; however, identifying certain general trends, applicable across a wide variety of 
scenarios, is possible through robust analysis. Future commanders will have a mixture of 
reconnaissance UAS, attack UAS, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and more. In 
6 
expeditionary environments, the amount of material a unit can transport is limited. 
Decisions must be made by the commander on how many of these systems and pieces of 
ordnance to bring. Having too many light anti-personnel systems in a battle involving large 
numbers of light armored amphibious vehicles could be catastrophic. Conversely, bringing 
too many ATGMs with limited range will reduce the commander’s competitive advantage 
against an all-infantry force conducting jungle warfare.  
Finally, a commander may ask “how will I survive the opening salvos of the enemy 
assault?” The enemy gets a vote. Near peer and peer competitors are developing and have 
demonstrated capability with UAS systems (Chase et al. 2015), and land, ship, and air 
launched cruise and ballistic missiles (Heginbotham et al. 2015). To defend against these 
threats, and survive until the ground battle begins, a commander must consider taking a 
combination of steps. Historical air base attack data analyzed by RAND (Vick 2015) 
indicates the important factors for success are: 
1. Camouflage, concealment, and deception 
2. Hardening 
3. On-base dispersal 
4. Postattack recovery 
What do these factors look like on the future battlefield, and how do commanders 
achieve them? Shown below, in Figure 3, is a Marine javelin team conducting a missile 
battle drill. Such battle drills will still be required; however, javelins alone may not be 
sufficient to counter future threats (Mesimer 2021). Furthermore, the current battle drill 
may not consider factors that will be present on the future battlefield. 
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Photo courtesy of Corporal Savannah Mesimer 
Figure 3. Exercise Fuji Viper 21.2  
These questions and concepts illustrate the massive nature of the “wicked problem” 
that faces today’s military planners and strategists. Marine infantry companies will be a 
small part of the solution. First principles thinking necessitates problem solving by starting 
small and improving ever-increasing size systems by iteratively focusing on making each 
element more effective. This technique is vital for breaking down this problem, and finding 
smaller solutions to small problems, which in aggregate will yield operational victory. 
C. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To better inform planners, future testing and evaluation, and decision makers, 
simulation modeling with data farming techniques is employed to provide cost effective 
insights into the most important characteristics of the force and possible future techniques, 
tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Identifying these characteristics, also known as factors, will 
allow targeted investment in time, capital, and manpower to achieve more lethal outcomes 
by survivable future infantry companies. 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on company and company-supported operations against a near-
peer or peer adversaries. It examines two questions: 
8 
• How might a future company commander best design their engagement 
area? 
• How much ordnance and of what type will a company require to engage 
an enemy force of a given size and type? 
The figure below highlights the complex system of systems that EABO requires. 
The red box outlines the infantry component of the problem set, the small piece that this 
thesis work examines. 
 
Figure 4. The Future Operational Framework 
The scenarios examined align with the current force design proposals for the future 
infantry company. The study is based on micro-tactical scenarios and its results are 
meaningful to future company commanders and operations officers conducting company 
and battalion level operations. This thesis sets conditions for future work on the same topic 
as force design assumptions and planning is refined, and new and emerging technological 
capabilities are better understood. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The following process was conducted to examine the future infantry company in 
the context of the problem statement: 
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1. Define measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for EABO operations. 
2. Develop and model scenarios in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
Version V (MANA-V) (McIntosh et al. 2007) to study the future 
operational environment. 
3. Apply a robust design of experiments (DOE) and data farming techniques 
developed by the Naval Postgraduate School SEED Center for Data 
Farming (https://harvest.nps.edu) to examine a wide variety of factors at 
different levels. 
4. Run the simulations and collect the output data.  
5. Compute the MOEs from the output data. 
6. Employ statistical modeling techniques to build metamodels that quantify 
the influence of different factors on the outcome of the scenario.  
7. Analyze the metamodels to gain insights into how to design future forces 
and suggest TTPs.  
8. Provide recommendations to stakeholders in the Marine Corps to inform 
future live force experimentation and wargaming analysis.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the proposed changes to infantry concepts of employment and 
provides context to experimental design. It reviews what the changes are, how the changes 
apply to doctrine, and how these concepts are examined in MANA-V. Chapter III discusses 
model development. The scenario and corresponding factors and levels are explained along 
with key model assumptions. The limitations of the software are also discussed with 
proposed methods of overcoming important shortfalls. Chapter IV discusses the design of 
experiments, including factor selection, use of a nearly orthogonal and balanced design to 
explore the factor space, and the data farming process. Chapter V provides an analysis of 
the output data and experimental results. Finally, Chapter VI gives recommendations based 
upon the experimental results and suggests further areas for research by the Marine Corps 
and other entities.  
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II. INFANTRY COMPANY OPERATIONS, FORCE DESIGN 2030 
AND THE MODELING ENVIRONMENT 
Stand-in forces take advantage of the relative strength of the contemporary 
defense and rapidly-emerging new technologies to create an integrated 
maritime defense that is optimized to operate in close and confined seas in 
defiance of adversary long-range precision “stand-off” capabilities. 
—38th Commandant 
This chapter provides background on infantry company operations and proposed 
Force Design 2030 changes. It seeks to inform the reader unfamiliar with these ideas to 
provide context for the model. 
A. KEY COMPANY EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS 
Within a company defense, there are two key concepts that govern the employment 
of fires to destroy an enemy force. These concepts are “massed surprised fires” and “HAW-
MAW-LAW.” (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps 2018b) 
Massed surprised fires is the concept that a unit will remain covered and concealed 
until the decisive moment to engage the enemy. At the commander’s direction, or when a 
certain condition is met, the force simultaneously, or close to simultaneously, engages the 
enemy force to create shock and surprise. By engaging with all combat power at the same 
time, a commander seeks to mask his position until the decisive moment and not draw 
enemy fire. This concept requires an ambush mentality and traditionally does not take full 
advantage of the standoff capabilities of friendly weapon systems. It is often used whenever 
the enemy has an advantage in standoff weapon systems or armor. While difficult to 
achieve in higher echelon formations, the advent of loitering munitions being launched 
from multiple positions could change what massed surprised fires looks like. The surprise 
element in massed surprised fires can generate a disruption to the enemy system and if 
successful may lead to the destruction of the enemy force before it can competently react.  
HAW-MAW-LAW stands for “heavy anti-armor weapons, medium anti-armor 
weapons, light anti-armor weapons.” This concept leverages the max effective range of 
friendly weapon systems. Heavy anti-armor weapons engage the enemy at the maximum 
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possible range. When the enemy reaches medium anti-armor weapon range, medium 
weapons are employed by friendly forces. Finally, when the enemy reaches light anti-armor 
weapons range, those weapons are employed. In aggregate, enemy forces are attrited over 
time as they move further into the friendly force weapon engagement zone.  
B. FUTURE INFANTRY COMPANY OPERATIONS 
The MLR is a formation optimized for future battles against a peer or near-peer 
competitor in the littoral areas of the world. It combines the long-range strike capability of 
land-based anti-ship missiles with the security of an infantry battalion and sustainment of 
an expeditionary logistics combat element (United States Marine Corps 2021). The MLR 
can employ HAW-MAW-LAW to influence the operational level of war. As part of a 
defense of the EAB, a Marine infantry company may employ HAW-MAW-LAW using 
organic precision fires or mass surprised fires, depending on the scenario (Headquarters, 
United States Marine Corps 2018b). While the nature of defensive missions of the Marine 
infantry remains relatively the same as in the past, the character of those defensive missions 
is changing due to new and emerging technologies. 
The mission of Marine infantry is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by 
fire and maneuver or repel their assault by fire and close combat (Headquarters, United 
States Marine Corps 2018a). This mission contributes to sea control and sea denial by the 
MLR through the protection of “kill assets” such as anti-ship missile batteries. In a great 
power competition environment, the protection of such assets is extremely challenging, 
especially within the enemy WEZ. Enemy threats to the force include the following non-
comprehensive list: 
1. Strike capabilities (surface-to-surface, air-to-surface) 
2. Anti-lodgment forces (conventional attack) 
3. Special operations forces (SOF) 
4. Insurgent forces (state backed or non-state backed) 
In a general conflict, a hybrid strategy that combines these assets could be used to contest 
the MLR’s activities.  
13 
Future Marine Infantry Companies will be asked to conduct a wide variety of 
missions in support of the MLR in expeditionary environments. These missions may 
include: 
1. Fixed site security 
2. Mobile/convoy security 
3. Seizure of key terrain 
4. Defense of key terrain 
5. Attack against an enemy force 
In that future environment, it is unclear what sized enemy forces a Marine Company 
may be matched against. This research specifically examines what size counter lodgment 
force a Marine infantry company can defend against. By better understanding relative 
combat power, a commander may better employ such a future company in economy of 
force operations. Furthermore, these examinations will aid the commander in 
understanding if a company can achieve massed fires without physically massing platoons 
in a traditional linear defense. 
C. FORCE DESIGN 2030 
Lance Corporal James Duncan lay low in his fighting position. Incoming waves of 
enemy UAS circled overhead searching for targets in the dense jungle undergrowth. 
Beyond the sand dune 800 meters to LCpl Duncan’s front, an enemy platoon massed in 
defilade. He quietly activated the attack UAS pre-laid in a small clearing 100 meters from 
his position. The small quadcopter lifted off through a break in the trees and quickly moved 
to the pre-designated waypoint. As the quadcopter crested the dune, the enemy appeared 
LCpl Duncan’s tablet. Targets populated the screen as the quadcopter assessed its sight 
picture. After gaining positive identification of the threat, LCpl Duncan engaged. The 
attack UAS buzzed into a cluster of individuals with two radios and detonated, spalling 
fragmentation through the enemy ranks. LCpl Duncan slipped his tablet into his Ferriday 
case, and moved to his secondary position.  
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Future expeditionary environments will require the integration of large numbers of 
capabilities at the company level. Placing more capabilities in company organic, properly 
sized packages will allow a company commander to conduct timely operations on the 
battlefield. The author envisions one small kill chain in the opening vignette. In that 
scenario, one Marine and one UAS operate with little oversight. Now imagine that scaling 
to dozens of UAS and Marines working independently but needing to synchronize their 
actions simultaneously. 
The intent of these changes to the Marine infantry company is to make smaller units 
more survivable and lethal. Specific proposed changes involve both personnel and 
equipment. Key proposed table of organization and equipment (TO&E) changes included 
in the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations include 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps 2021): 
1. Anti-armor teams -- each company will include multiple anti-armor teams 
with javelin missiles organic to the company headquarters.  
2. Enhanced logistics capability -- each company will include a more robust 
logistics package with specialists for planning and execution of 
expeditionary operations. 
3. Enhanced fires clearance and control -- each company fires support team 
will be augmented to be more robust and able to clear fires in the company 
battlespace.  
4. Organic precision fires with loitering munitions -- each company, platoon, 
and squad will have the ability to conduct precision strikes with future 
loitering munitions that enable better targeting at further distances.  
5. Anti-armor weapons at the squad level -- each squad will have a medium 
anti-armor weapon (MAAW). The variety of available rockets for the 
system will enable squads to engage point targets with high explosives at 
greater distances, such as light amphibious mechanized vehicles.  
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6. Future infantry Marines will have enhanced communications equipment 
that provides the rifleman to the company commander a better common 
operating picture (COP) to drive maneuver warfare.  
7. Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles (ULTVs) will be employed down to the 
squad level to increase mobility and carrying capacity of infantrymen. 
8. Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) will be employed at the company 
level to support logistics, communications, and fires. 
 
Photo courtesy of Corporal Jose Marquez 
Figure 5. Jungle Reconnaissance 
Pictured above is a Marine moving through dense jungle. If not for the different 
rifle and helmet, this photo could be from the Vietnam War or Guadalcanal (Marquez 
2021). The character of war is changing rapidly with new and advancing technologies. 
These changes provide an opportunity to fuse the new and old into a new, more lethal 
iteration of maneuver warfare. Modeling and simulation can be used to assess the potential 
impacts of these new technologies that are not yet fielded. 
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D. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA-V) 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata version 5 (MANA-V) is a stochastic, time 
step, agent-based distillation modeling software. It was created by the Defence Technology 
Agency, in Auckland, New Zealand for employment in military operations research. 
MANA was specifically selected for employment in this thesis due to its flexibility in 
modeling complex kill chains through sensor shooter agents linked with different 
communications networks (McIntosh et al. 2007). Under the MANA paradigm, agents are 
combined into squads with different characteristics that mirror sensors and weapon 
systems—both current and proposed. The size, composition, and personalities of different 
squads can be changed to model real world behavior, and study different interactions in 
simulation which cannot be studied in live-fire experimentation. Limits to live-fire 
experimentation in this context are due to many of these technologies not existing yet in 
the prescribed form, and limitations to time and funding due to current operational tempos 
in the Fleet. 
Throughout the modeling process, MANA enables the layering of command-and-
control networks between squads and agents. This functionality enables the exploration of 
network latency and message corruption. Additionally, the echeloning of fires in the attack 
and defense can be controlled through these networks.  
As with all modeling environments, MANA has limitations and assumptions must 
be made. The MANA environment is statistical in nature rather than being a physics-based 
model. MANA is not predictive, but rather allows researchers to identify model-based 
trends which are important to senior decision makers and the logical consequences that 




III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
To date our wargaming has focused on a limited set of scenarios; thus, we 
will need to expand our analysis across more scenarios to better inform our 
force design efforts. 
—38th Commandant 
This chapter examines the iterative model development process. It describes the 
constraints, limitations, and assumptions of the model and modeling environment and how 
those factors drove scenario development. 
A. THE SCENARIO 
To select a proper scenario location and enemy composition, the author first 
consulted the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(Headquarters, United States Marine Corps 2021). Key requirements include the following: 
1. Littoral environment mirroring future potential EAB sites. 
2. Large enough for a company-sized element, including a company-sized 
restricted operations zone and other fire support coordination measures. 
3. Not a specific location identified for future operations or a location that 
could be construed as such. 
This thesis intends to provide a baseline for inputs into live-fire experimentation 
and wargaming; therefore, the author selected Camp Pendleton as the map location for 
modeling purposes to meet the above criteria. In addition, the modeled area is easily and 
inexpensively accessible to the Marine Corps for live experimentation and is known to the 
author. A decision-maker could read this thesis and conduct a terrain walk with Marines to 
discuss the scenario on the simulated terrain. Professional development exercises, such as 
“tactical exercises without troops” or command post exercises, can be used to examine this 




Figure 6. Camp Pendleton Model Scenario Map 
The terrain map used to simulate Camp Pendleton, or “model playboard” is 150 
nautical miles by 150 nautical miles. Depicted in Figure 7, it captures the corridor from 
San Diego to Los Angeles.  
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Figure 7. Model Terrain with Company ROZ Overlay 
While the used engagement area in the simulation is the company restricted 
operations zone (ROZ) overlayed on the terrain map, the author chose a much larger model 
playbox to enable future research. Future iterations of the base model in this thesis could 
include anti-ship missiles and other parts of the MLR. 
Each time step in the scenario models two seconds of time. The model runs for ten-
thousand-time steps, or approximately 5.5 hours of simulated battle. The purpose of two 
second time steps is to achieve high fidelity on agent action without making the 
computation requirement for each scenario to be onerous. If time steps are too large, then 
differentiating hits and kills becomes less precise. If time steps are too small, the 
computational time and model run time on processors becomes too long.  
The friendly unit modeled is a future infantry company envisioned in Force Design 
2030 (Headquarters, United States Marine Corps 2021). The modeled formation is 
conducting a defense while dispersed in the littoral terrain against an anti-lodgment 
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amphibious enemy force. The enemy force mission is to seize the key maritime terrain 
occupied by the friendly expeditionary advanced base the Marine company is part of. The 
mission of the Marine infantry company is to control the key maritime terrain to prevent 
interference with MLR operations.  
In such a scenario, the Marine infantry company engagement of the enemy force 
would be part of a greater concept of operations. It would be expected that Marine Littoral 
Regiment (MLR) assets such as anti-ship missiles would be employed against enemy assets 
to reduce the risk to the EAB if the enemy sought to dislodge it. Additionally, defensive 
counter air and surface-to-air missiles would be expected to provide anti-air defense. These 
two factors are not modeled and should be part of future modeling and simulation efforts. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the author chose to focus solely on a company-sized 
force of Marines. This focus aligns with a first principles approach, where the author seeks 
to start modeling with smaller kill chains at the fireteam level, and slowly progress through 
squad and platoon sized modeling efforts to a final company sized model. Modeling small 
interactions first, such as a squad employing an attack UAS against enemy infantry, 
allowed the author to ensure better fidelity to real-world outcomes. By more accurately 
modeling real interactions on the battlefield at a smaller level, the author sought to find 
more accurate trends in the analysis when the multiple, complex kill chains within a future 
Marine infantry company were aggregated into a full company-sized model. The diagram 
below shows the ground up approach from build 1 to build 8 as smaller force and kill chains 
were layered upon each other to create the company model.  
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Figure 8. Model Design Process 
The first build of the model focused on accurately simulating blue and red squads. 
The second build aggregated three blue squads into a platoon to ensure proper command 
and control and kill chain networks. Each build layered until the full model was constructed 
that included a full organic Marine infantry company engaged against a supported red 
mechanized infantry company.  
B. BLUE FORCE AGENT DESIGN 
Agents in the simulation range from fireteams to UAS. Red and Blue fireteams are 
each an aggregated agent that represent multiple combatants. Hit requirements to kill fire 
team agents correspond to the number of templated combatants in the fireteam. Each red 
and blue UAS on the battlefield is also an agent. UAS swarms are squads comprised of 
multiple UAS agents.  
A Marine infantry squad, show in Figure 9, is comprised of three agents: two 
fireteam agents and a squad headquarters agent. Each fireteam agent represents six 
Marines. In addition to basic rifleman loadouts such as M27 rifles and fragmentation 
grenades, one fireteam is equipped with a medium anti-armor weapon (MAAW), and one 
fireteam with an M240B medium machine gun. The squad headquarters represents the 
squad leader, assistant squad leader, and UAS operator.  
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Figure 9. Squad Level Modeling 
Each Marine platoon is comprised of three squads and a platoon headquarters agent. 
The platoon headquarters consists of the platoon commander, platoon sergeant, and radio 
operator. Each platoon possesses organic precision fires one class one UAS. For simulation 
purposes, these are templated as anti-personnel fragmentation warhead attack UAS. Figure 
10 summarizes the platoon design. 
 
Figure 10. Platoon Level Modeling 
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The Marine infantry company includes three platoons, a company headquarters 
agent, company fires/intelligence agent, company logistics agent, 81mm mortar section, 
and three javelin teams. The company fires and intelligence cell possess organic precision 
fires one class two UAS. These UAS are templated as anti-armor capable shape charge 
warhead attack UAS. The company design is summarized in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Company Level Modeling 
C. RED FORCE AGENT DESIGN 
The red force infantry squad is comprised of two fireteam agents. Each agent takes 
five hits to kill to represent the five individuals in each fireteam. Every red fireteam has a 
medium machine gun, rocket propelled grenade launcher, and three rifles. The parent unit 
for each squad is an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle.  
The red amphibious infantry fighting vehicles are modeled from ZBD-05s (Janes 
2021). Each ZBD has a 30mm canon, coaxial machine gun, and two red arrow anti-tank 
guided missiles. They are capable of traversing water at 3–5 knots and moving 25 
kilometers an hour across the beach.  
Each red amphibious mechanized infantry company is comprised of 10 ZBD-05s 
and 10 infantry squads. Each squad is embarked in a vehicle to start the simulation and 
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disembarks when certain criteria are met. One ZBD-05 houses the company commander 
and one ZBD-05 houses the company executive officer. These ZBDs are modeled as 
having more robust communications suites to communicate with ships and other red assets 
to call for and coordinate supporting fires.  
Red naval assets include an amphibious ship and a missile corvette. The missile 
corvette can provide naval surface fire support with land-attack missiles and is templated 
to have a magazine capacity of 10 missiles. Fires coordination for the missile corvette flows 
through the amphibious ship to simulate a fire support coordination center. On board the 
amphibious ship are UAS swarms capable of supporting the amphibious infantry company 
with reconnaissance and loitering munitions. Each swarm is a squad of four agents with 
anti-personnel fragmentary warheads.  
Table 1. Red Force Design 
 
 
D. BLUE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER 
The mission of the Marine company is to block enemy forces in order to prevent 
disruption of expeditionary base operations. The Marine company concept of operations is 
to mass fires from three different platoon-sized positions using attack UAS envisioned in 
the Organic Precision Fires (OPF) capability set. The platoons are camouflaged and will 
only engage with direct fire weapons if directly threatened by the enemy force as to not 
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give away their position. Pictured below is a rendering of a defense where Marine units use 
the micro terrain of the coastal hills to mask their positions with cover and concealment.  
 
Figure 12. Blue Force Laydown 
Included in the defense is a section of two 81mm mortars to provide indirect fire 
capability to the company commander. A key assumption of the blue defense is that the 
company is operating within its own restricted operations zone in which the company may 
use the entirety of its organic capabilities without clearance from the battalion fire support 
coordination center. It is assumed that the engagement criteria, rules of engagement, and 
fire support coordination measures are structured to maximize the company commander’s 
flexibility and responsiveness in his sector. Key kill chain decision trees are shown below 







Figure 13. UAS Kill Chain from Forward Sensor 
 
Figure 14. UAS Kill Chain from Platoon Detection 
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Figure 15. 81mm Kill Chain 
 
Figure 16. ATGM Kill Chain 
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The Marine company will employ its organic fires to attrite the enemy as it 
approaches the beach. It is assumed that the Marine company will not mass into a linear 
defense due to the risk from the enemy’s reconnaissance and fires assets. It is also assumed 
that the Marine company will seek to minimize movement which could be detected by 
enemy reconnaissance assets. The Marines will operate from their cover and concealment 
and only expose themselves if necessary or at a decisive moment when they can gain a 
decisive advantage.  
Victory conditions for the Marine Company is destruction of the first wave of the 
enemy landing force, the red amphibious mechanized company. The decisive destruction 
of the first wave of enemy forces could have a disruptive effect on the enemy scheme of 
maneuver by delaying their operations, buying more time for EAB displacement, or the 
arrival of joint combat power able to destroy the enemy fleet.  
E. RED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER 
The overall red force mission is to block the coast highway in order to prevent 
expeditionary base displacement. The enemy concept of operations is to employ attack and 
reconnaissance UAS and land-attack missiles to support the landing of an amphibious 
mechanized company on the coast. The mission of the enemy mechanized company is to 
establish a blocking position on the coastal highway to facilitate the maneuver of follow-on 
forces. It is assumed that the red force in the model would be operating as part of a larger 
naval task group. By limiting the model to a portion of the battle, better fidelity on battle 
outcomes is obtained. The amphibious approach of the red force is shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Red Force Amphibious Approaches 
The red force victory condition is the successful occupation of a blocking position 
on the coastal highway. If any red forces remain on the objective, it is considered a red 
victory. Combined, the red and blue schemes of maneuver and geometries of fire can be 
visualized using Figure 18 below.  
 
Figure 18. Geometries of Fire 
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For modeling purposes, generic ground sensors are placed at the water’s edge. 
These sensors allow experimentation with how far from the beach the blue force can sense 
the red force. By simplifying this process with the three ground sensors, the modeling can 
examine reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance in an unclassified setting without 
modeling specific agents.  
F. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) 
The key Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) examined in this thesis are: 
1. Total red ZBDs destroyed during a simulated battle. 
2. Total blue force casualties during a simulated battle. 
3. Blue achieving victory at the end of a simulated battle.  
 
These MOEs are designed to capture the survivability and lethality of the Marine 
infantry company. The first MOE, total red ZBDs destroyed, captures blue force lethality 
during the battle. The second MOE, total blue force casualties, captures the survivability 
of the blue force during the battle. The third MOE, blue achieving victory, captures whether 
the operational requirements of the blue force are met during the battle. This specifically 
is measured in whether the red force establishes a blocking position on the key terrain 
overlooking the coastal highway by the end of the battle. If there are no remaining red 
forces on that objective, then it is a blue force victory. The outcomes from the simulation 
in each of these MOEs can inform battalion and MLRs firing planning documents such as 
an Attack Guidance Matrices (AGM), a document that prioritizes classes of targets and 
guides weapon to target matches.  
It is important to note that red infantry casualties were not used as a measure of 
effectiveness in the model. Red infantry casualty metrics were collected, however, through 
iterative modeling the author found that they were not very informative. During model 
development the survivability of the red force infantry was found to be very low, especially 
in the presence of blue force OPF 1 class 1 systems. If red force infantry survived, then 
there were always surviving red force ZBDs. If all red force ZBDs were destroyed, then all 
red force infantry would also always be destroyed. This phenomenon occurred because of 
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the lethality of the blue OPF 1 class 1 systems and mortars. The disaggregated blue forces 
destroyed remaining red infantry on the red force objective if any remained even if they 
did not have enough anti-armor assets to destroy the remaining ZBDs. Through the iterative 
process, the author found that measuring remaining ZBDs was a much better measure of 
blue force lethality during a simulated battle because the red force’s ability to generate 
victory entirely depended on if ZBDs survived. This finding is more closely examined in 
Chapter V on model analysis. 
G. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
This section aggregates the assumptions of the model for quick reference. 
Red Assumptions: 
1. Calls for fire support by the red mechanized company will originate from 
the company commander or executive officer. If both are dead, then no 
calls for fire will originate from the red company. This assumption is 
based on PLA formations being hierarchical and naval surface fire support 
complex. The author assesses that NCOs in ZBDs without advanced 
communication suites will be unable to accurately call for and clear fires.  
2. If available, the red force will send out an advanced UAS swarm in front 
of the mechanized company as a reconnaissance element. This forward 
element is composed of dual use UAS which can both loiter for 
reconnaissance purposes and attack after finding the correct target. 
3. Calls for fire from the mechanized company, land attack missile strikes, or 
other strikes using reconnaissance/attack UAS will pass through the red 
amphibious ship, which will either launch a UAS swarm in response or 
coordinate land attack missiles through the missile corvette. This 
assumption is predicated on a supporting arms coordination center being 
required to deconflict airspace and enforce fire support coordination 
measures. 
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4. The red missile corvette will be limited to 10 land attack missiles. (Janes 
2021)  
Blue Assumptions: 
1. The infantry company will not attack enemy shipping with their OPF 
system. It is assumed that battalion and higher levels would target enemy 
ships in this scenario. Additionally, the anti-ship effects of attack UAS are 
unknown to the author and beyond the scope of this study. 
2. The company only operates on doctrinal networks, i.e., a fireteam will not 
call the company headquarters for fire support. In extremis, this is 
possible, but was not modeled as MANA-V has limitations in modifying 
C4ISR networks during simulation runs. 
3. OPF 1 class 1 systems are only launched when a set of possible targets are 
identified, i.e., they will not be launched before ZBDs drop ramp and 
infantry disembarks. It is assumed that OPF 1 class 1 is not capable of 
destroying a ZBD with its fragmentary warhead. Anti-armor effects of 
OPF 1 class 1 UAS are unknown to the author. 
4. The Marine Company has a restricted operations zone (ROZ) over their 
positions that enables the clearance and employment of UAS at the 
company level. Individual UAS operators act within a set of engagement 
criteria and priorities of fire to govern UAS employment. The MLR is 
operating in a distributed manner and the company does not have time to 
clear all its actions with the parent battalion or may not have 
communication with the parent battalion. 
Other Assumptions: 






IV. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
EABO complement the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations Concept 
and will inform how we approach missions against peer adversaries. 
—38th Commandant 
This chapter examines the experimental design process and its implications for 
experimental results. Specifically, it illustrates the building of a nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercube to examine low correlation main effects with metamodeling. 
A. CONCEPT OF EXPERIMENTATION 
Experimentation began after internal verification and validation of the model. To 
conduct internal verification and validation, 30 independent model runs were conducted on 
the base model. Output data was examined to find errors in weapon to target matches or 
any undesired behavior in different agents. If undesired behavior was discovered, 
modifications were made to the model, and another 30 replications were conducted. This 
iterative process continued until the model required no additional modification. Once 
internal verification and validation was completed, experimentation began. 
Experimentation was sequential, with each experiment building off the previous one. A 
total of 44,500 simulated battles were conducted across three experimental sets from 445 
total design points.  
Experiment 1, the base case, conducted 100 repetitions of one design point 
consisting of the base model. The base model included all layers of the model for both blue 
and red forces, i.e., red naval surface fire support and attack UAS supporting the 
mechanized red company against the blue company with full OPF capabilities.  
Experiment 2, threat assessment analysis, examined eight design points. The design 
points turned off and on different capability sets for both red and blue force. The purpose 
of Experiment 2 was to examine the relative effects of the different capabilities. Figure 19 
shows the eight different design points which explore the different capability combinations 
that characterize the battle.  
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Figure 19. Experiment 2 Design 
Experiment 3 examined 436 design points. One-hundred independent replications 
were conducted for each design point for a total of 43,600 simulated battles. The purpose 
of Experiment 3 was to examine key factors discussed in the factors and levels section 
below to inform commanders on favorable technical requirements and favorable 
techniques, tactics, and procedures.  
The progression of experimentation can be seen in Figure 20, which shows how the 
depth and breadth of experimentation increased as the author explored the model outcomes.  
 





B. FACTORS AND LEVELS 
To select factors, an extensive examination of infantry force design planning 
documents was conducted to understand key concerns from operational units. These 
concerns incapsulated unknowns about new and emerging technologies that are not yet 
integrated into conventional Marine infantry formations. Additionally, unknowns existed 
on model input parameters such as communication latency, which are more influenced by 
human procedures yet to be refined, not undeveloped technologies.  
Experiment 1 varied no factors. It sought to understand the natural variation 
inherent in the base model and its corresponding parameters. Experiment 2 varied force 
design to examine different force mixes for both the red and blue force. No weapon 
parameters or other factors were varied, just whether the capability was included or not. 
The eight design points of Experiment 2 are illustrated in the table below. “T” indicates 
“true,” that the capability indicated is included in the scenario for that design point. “F” 
indicates “false,” that the capability indicated was not included in the scenario for that 
design point. 
Table 2. Experiment 2 DOE 
DP Blue Infantry Blue OPF Red Mech Co Red UAS Red NSFS 
1 T F T F F 
2 T F T F T 
3 T F T T F 
4 T F T T T 
5 T T T F F 
6 T T T F T 
7 T T T T F 
8 T T T T T 
 
Experiment 3 varied a variety of factors. In general, these factors fell into two 




Figure 21. Factor Selection 
After examining the possible factors to be explored, a subset was selected to enable 
high fidelity on key issues. These factors are summarized in the tables and descriptions 
below.  
Table 3. Categorical Factors 
 
 
The two categorical factors selected are red UAS and red naval surface fire support. 
These two support capabilities enable red force maneuver. These two factors were selected 
to better examine the interaction of these capabilities on the red force kill web. By including 
these, interactions with blue force characteristics can be examined to inform fires priorities 
at the battalion and MLR level attack guidance matrices. 
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A variety of discrete and continuous factors were used to examine the blue force 
under different conditions. These factors all relate to the “sensor-shooter” paradigm 
described in the first two chapters. Key factors include latency in the kill chain to examine 
how closing the loop at different speeds to kill the enemy enables battlefield victory. UAS 
characteristics such as swarm size, number of waves, and probability of kill were examined 
to determine favorable parameter mixes. Investigating these UAS attributes enable 
recommendations to testing agencies and wargaming professionals on force requirements. 
MAAW probability of kill was examined as the efficacy of the weapon system was 
unknown to the author, and testing data not readily available. By varying MAAW 
probability of kill, sensitivity analysis can be done to understand how important this squad 
level anti-armor weapon is to mission success. Finally, engagement distance was examined 
to understand the trade-off between HAW-MAW-LAW and massed surprised fires as 
tactics to be employed by the blue force. To accurately model this, engagement distance 
was tied to the OPF availability times. OPF 1 class 2 UAS squads were activated in 
sequence. The earlier they are activated, the sooner they could attack the red force. By 
controlling when these agents are active, and making them active later, different 
engagement distances were be tested. The discrete and continuous factors explored are 
summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Discrete and Continuous Factors 
    
38 
C. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL AND BALANCED DESIGN 
To examine the above factors using the model, the author used a nearly orthogonal 
and balanced experimental design (Vieira et al. 2013) that facilitates a robust analysis 
(Sanchez and Sanchez 2020). The design the author used was developed using the 
evolutionary algorithm in Second Order Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes for 
Exploring Complex Stochastic Simulations, by MacCalman, Vieira, and Lucas (2017). 
First, a 45-design point, nearly orthogonal and balanced design was constructed using a 
nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube for continuous factors (Cioppa and Lucas 2007). This 
hypercube was then combined with a 64-design point resolution V fractional factorial to 
add corner points. The resulting 109 design points were then crossed with a 2 × 2 full 
factorial design of the categorical factors. The result is an experimental design with 436 
design points. The maximum absolute pairwise correlation between continuous variables 
in the design is 0.0007. Correlation between continuous variables and the space-filling 
properties of the design is illustrated in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. DOE Maximum Pairwise Correlation 
From Figure 22, the space-filling properties of the design and addition of corner 
points using the partial fractional factorial design are illustrated. With the maximum 
absolute pairwise correlation being so low, confounding effects are mitigated. More 










V. DATA ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
All of our investments in data science, machine learning, and artificial 




This chapter examines the output data from all three experiments using visual and 
statistical analysis and metamodeling to understand key drivers, interactions, and threshold 
points of the experiment factors and additionally provides evidence for force design 
recommendations. 
A. JMP PRO AND ANALYTIC METHODS 
To conduct analysis on the model results, the author applied a series of methods 
and tools. The two tools used to conduct analysis are JMP Pro and the R statistical 
programming language. JMP Pro is a suite of predictive analytics software (JMP Pro, 
2021). R is a common programming language used for statistical analysis (R: The R Project 
for Statistical Computing, 2021). Each tool provided certain functionality and flexibility. 
Key techniques used for analysis are multiple linear regression, stepwise 
regression, partition trees, and random forest machine learning. These techniques enabled 
an understanding of critical interactions in the model of interest to warfighters and drove 
the author’s recommendations.  
B. STOCHASTIC VARIABILITY OF REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIO 
The model used in this research is stochastic in nature and therefore exhibits 
variability at each design point. This variability is captured by running the simulation with 
different random seeds, with all other inputs held constant, to assess how much pure 
randomness contributes to the variability of model outcomes. To assess the stochastic 
variability of the model, 100 independent replications of the base case were conducted. The 
data collected demonstrates quantitatively the stochastic variation possible in the combat 
scenario. The model variation is demonstrated via experiment 1.  
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C. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 BASE CASE 
Experiment 1 examined the base model with default parameter inputs. To examine 
the base case, 100 independent replications were run. Key outputs the author assessed to 
understand stochastic variability include total blue force casualties, total red ZBDs 
destroyed, and probability of blue victory. Each of these outcomes is summarized in the 
below figures.  
 
Figure 23. Experiment 1 Blue Force Casualties  
As seen in Figure 23, there is significant variation in the number of blue casualties 
over the 100 simulated battles. The minimum number of blue casualties is 17 while the 
maximum is 61. There are a total possible number of 181 blue casualties. The variation in 
this MOE is due to the inherent randomness in conflict. The red force possessed attack 
UAS, naval surface fire support assets, and the red infantry company’s organic weapon 
systems such as the 30mm ZBD cannon. For the blue force, a missed MAAW shot early in 
the battle, or a UAS that malfunctions can have big implications later. Imagine a situation 
where a ZBD is not destroyed in the water and is able to make landfall. That ZBD may 
during subsequent engagements find and destroy an entire squad of blue force Marines. 
This outcome demonstrates why getting small things such as a rocket battle drill right are 
so critical to the greater fight. This variability is similarly seen in Figure 24 below, which 
examines ZBD casualties.  
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Figure 24. Experiment 1 ZBD Casualties 
In the preponderance of simulated battles, the blue infantry company destroyed all 
10 red force ZBDs. The kill assets included MAAW anti-armor rockets, javelin missiles, 
and OPF 1 class 2 UAS. Even with all these assets, the red force still wins certain 
engagements. Seen below in Figure 25, the blue force won 89% of the battles in our base 
case scenario. Victory, as discussed in previous chapters, is defined as the blue force 
preventing the red force from establishing a blocking position on the coastal highway. If 
any red forces remain on the objective by the end of the battle, the blue force loses. As a 
DOD doctrinal tactical task, the blue force must “control” the key terrain. 
 
Figure 25. Experiment 1 Blue Probability of Victory 
The base case, in which blue had access to significant numbers of OPF systems, is 
generally favorable to the blue force. The 95% confidence interval for probability of blue 
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victory ranges from 82.8% to 95.2%. While not a guarantee, these outcomes are on the 
favorable side of the risk curve for blue forces, even with the large potential for casualties. 
From this base case, the high attrition nature of the future battlefield is evident. Even with 
blue winning in the model, it is probable that almost an entire platoon will be lost. From 
watching scenario playbacks, it is clear that precision loitering munitions drive these 
outcomes, as they enable a faster and more lethal kill chain for both sides in the battle.  
D. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 RELATIVE THREAT 
COMPARISON 
Experiment 2 explored the effects of Blue OPF and Red UAS and NSFS on the 
outcome of the simulated battles. For Experiment 2, 100 replications of eight different 
design points were run, for a total of 800 simulated battles. For design points one through 
four, the blue force did not have OPF capability. For design points five through eight, the 
blue force did have OPF capability. The survivability of the blue force is illustrated in 
Figure 26.  
 
Figure 26. Experiment 2 Blue Force Survivability 
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In Figure 26, there is a distinct difference between the first four design points and 
the last four design points. When the blue force does not have OPF, it takes significantly 
higher numbers of casualties, about a third of the company. When the blue force does have 
OPF, in design points five to eight, it takes significantly less casualties, i.e., is much more 
survivable. It is also worth noting that there is much more variability when blue has OPF. 
The difference in the two outcomes is due to the standoff capabilities of the OPF systems. 
OPF enables the blue force commander to attrite the enemy before the ZBDs reach direct 
fire range and can engage the blue force. This trend is especially true when engaging ZBDs 
in open water. ZBDs cannot gain cover or concealment and are extremely vulnerable at 
sea. Because they are only moving 3–5 knots in the water, the blue force achieves 
catastrophic kills in which both the ZBD and any infantrymen it is carrying are killed or 
rendered combat ineffective. The difference between design points 5/6 and 7/8 are the 
addition of red force attack UAS. In design points 7 and 8, the red force possesses attack 
UAS swarms that they can use for both reconnaissance and engagement of the blue force. 
From the graphic, the great increase in casualties is apparent. The positive effect of OPF 
on blue force outcomes extends to their lethality, shown in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27. Experiment 2 Blue Force Lethality 
When the blue force has OPF, the number of red ZBD casualties increases 
significantly. Additionally, the variation in ZBD casualties decreases. This outcome is 
important because it demonstrates the lethality gains that stand-off loitering munitions 
achieve, and the decrease in risk. When the blue force commander does not have OPF, the 
probability of destroying all 10 enemy ZBDs decreases substantially, and victory is 
uncertain. When the blue force commander does have OPF, the paradigm shifts. Victory is 
much more likely with less variance in outcomes. This trend is reflected in the probability 
of victory for the blue force shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Experiment 2 Blue Force Probability of Victory 
When the blue force does not have OPF, the probability of victory is extremely low. 
Due to the need to disperse forces, the blue force commander cannot mass enough combat 
power without OPF. The ability to mass loitering munitions at the decisive point is 
therefore critical to victory.  
To assess the relative threats from red naval surface fire support and attack UAS, 
partition trees were created for blue casualties, red ZBD casualties, and blue probability of 
victory. Figure 29, below, examines blue casualties and provides evidence of the risk to 
force by different enemy assets. The risk to force is strongly linked to the survivability of 
the force because this is a combat scenario where casualties are being taken due to red force 
action. The partition tree analytic method examines the importance of different factors on 
model outcomes. For this specific partition tree, the R-square is 0.89. This number 
represents the proportion of variance in the simulation explained by the metamodel. An R-
square of 0.89 indicates a strong metamodel fit on the simulation data.  
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Figure 29. Experiment 2 Blue Survivability Partition Tree 
The first split in the tree is on blue force structure. If blue possesses OPF, then the 
expected number of blue casualties is 15.8 in an engagement with red. If blue does not 
possess OPF, the expected number of casualties in an engagement is 54.2. This staggering 
difference is powerful evidence in support of a strong OPF capability at the company level. 
Lack of OPF systems make the future infantry company much less survivable and greatly 
increase the risk to force when defending against an amphibious assault. 
The second level of splits in the partition tree is on whether the red force has its 
own OPF systems. On the left side of the tree, if the red force has UAS, the expected 
number of blue casualties increases from 5.6 to 26.0. On the right side of the tree, if the red 
force has UAS, the expected number of casualties increases from 51.6 to 56.9. This 
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difference is smaller than the left side. The difference in these outcomes is due to blue 
having or not having OPF. If blue has OPF, then more ZBDs are killed coming ashore. 
This trend means that the enemy must rely on attack UAS as kill assets instead of ZBD 
direct fire weaponry to compensate for landing less combat power. When the blue force 
does not have OPF, as in the right side of the partition tree, they lose more forces regardless 
of whether red has attack UAS or not. This outcome occurs because the blue force has a 
less diverse kill web with less capacity. Without OPF, blue is relying solely on MAAWs 
and javelin missiles to defeat the ZBDs. This situation is not favorable and leads to an 
asymmetric risk profile, i.e., high risk to blue and low risk to red.  
The third level of splits in the partition tree is on whether the red force has naval 
surface fire support or not. Generally, if they do, the blue risk to force is higher, as expected. 
A key trend illustrated in the tree are outcomes when the red force has both UAS and naval 
surface fire support. Naval surface fire support is more effective when the red force also 
has UAS. In these cases, red can detect and classify targets with their UAS and call for fire 
from their naval surface fire support asset before the red infantry company makes landfall. 
The red force can then attack the remaining blue forces that are not killed by the naval 
surface fire support or attack UAS. This kill web enables efficient use of resources, 
leveraging a balance of precision and non-precision fires. Similar trends are seen when 
analyzing infantry company lethality using a partition tree, shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30. Experiment 2 Blue Force Lethality Partition Tree 
Figure 30, the blue force lethality partition tree splits on the same factors at the 
same levels of the tree as does the blue survivability partition tree in Figure 29. The R-
Square of 0.785 indicates a reasonable metamodel fit. The metamodel model reveals that 
when the blue force employs OPF, it doubles its lethality against red force ZBDs. When 
the blue force has OPF systems, OPF dominates the kill web as the most critical asset for 
the company commander. On the right side of the partition tree, the red force employment 
of their own attack UAS and naval surface fire support has less impact on blue force 
lethality. This trend means if the blue force uses OPF when red has support assets, the red 
force is not much more survivable. This trend is due to the ability of the blue force 
commander to launch OPF systems from concealment well off the shoreline. By gaining 
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more standoff, the search area that red must reconnoiter to find the blue OPF system 
increases. If the blue OPF launch points are well away from the expected red force 
objective, then it is less likely that they will be compromised by red UAS reconnoitering 
for red force maneuver. The standoff of the OPF systems also means that if the blue force 
platoon in vicinity of the red force objective is destroyed, then the blue force commander 
can still engage the red force with OPF systems and win the day. Both OPF 1 class 1 and 
OPF 1 class 2 UAS can be used to attack the enemy force as it attempts to consolidate on 
the red objective without physically maneuvering platoons. The lethality and survivability 
trends of the blue force drive overall victory outcomes, as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Experiment 2 Blue Probability of Victory 
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Figure 31, the blue probability of victory partition tree splits on the same factors as 
the previous two partition trees. The R-square of 0.865 indicates a strong metamodel fit. 
The probability of blue victory can be interpreted as the risk to mission. In this specific 
combat model, the blue force without OPF will probably lose, and the blue force with OPF 
will probably win. Small variation occurs if the red force also has UAS and naval surface 
fire support. The outcome is not much different, illustrating the dominance of OPF systems 
in the battle. Without OPF, the risk to mission for the blue force is extreme. In a 
disaggregated littoral environment, without outside support and the ability to mass direct 
fire weapons, the blue infantry company will not win unless it has the capability to mass 
loitering munitions.  
E. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 3 LETHALITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
Experiment 3 examined 436 design points with 100 independent replications of 
each. In the 43,600 simulated battles, data was collected to better understand blue force 
requirements in TTPs and equipment. The experimental design enables higher fidelity 
insights on how the blue force can survive and win. Models were fit to the summarized 
data, where each design point was summarized by its mean. 
1. Blue Force Survivability 
The first metamodel created to understand the outcomes from Experiment 3 
examined blue survivability. The measure of effectiveness of survivability was measured 
by number of blue force casualties in the battle. Figure 32 contains results from the stepwise 
regression fit, with mean(totalHitstoBlue) as the response.  
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Figure 32. Experiment 3 Blue Survivability Model 
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From the key factors in the model, the criticality of UAS employment by both sides 
is clear. The survivability model has an R-squared value of 0.70, suggesting that the model 
achieved a reasonable fit on the data but is unable to fully capture all of the complexities 
of the simulation. At the bottom of Figure 32, the lack of normality in the residual plot is 
shown. This lack of normality is partly due to the limit in number of blue force Marines 
that can be engaged in the scenario. However, the model is still built on the least square’s 
estimator, and therefore provides insight into the importance of different factors on 
scenario outcomes. The lack of normality means that the p-values are not precise. However, 
our purpose for metamodeling to is glean insight by developing readily interpretable 
surrogates of the simulation (Kliejnen et al. 2005).  
Based on the metamodel, the blue force achieves better survivability by first 
employing more waves of OPF. Improving this factor can be accomplished by decreasing 
the time between OPF wave launches while increasing the amount of time overall that the 
blue company can employ UAS before it is discovered and engaged. Increased speed in 
UAS employment can be attained through both TTPs and equipment. UAS clearance 
procedures and UAS launch battle drills are both TTPs that can drastically affect how many 
waves the blue company can launch in the scenario. The blue company can increase the 
amount of time it has to employ UAS by making the UAS launch positions harder to find 
and engage by the red force. While direct fire engagements may occur by a blue platoon 
against a red force, this does not preclude the blue force from engaging with UAS. Even if 
a blue platoon is destroyed, the blue company UAS can still engage, if they are not co-
located with the destroyed platoon and destroyed themselves. By disaggregating the blue 
force, survivability increases, and therefore lethality increases by allowing the blue force 
to engage with standoff munitions longer. Figure 33 below contains the parameter 




Figure 33. Experiment 3 Blue Survivability Parameter Estimates 
Figures 32 and 33 illustrate the need to remove the red force ability to use UAS and 
increase blue force swarm size. These second and third actions by the blue force will 
drastically reduce casualties in the blue force and align with the warfare principle of mass. 
By reducing the red force’s ability to mass loitering munitions, i.e., combat power, and 
increasing the blue force’s ability to mass loitering munitions, better blue force outcomes 
are obtained. Finally, the survivability model suggests that HAW-MAW-LAW is superior 
to mass surprised fires as an engagement concept for the blue force. As engagement 
distance increases, blue casualties decrease. This result suggests that if blue can engage 
first and begin to induce friction into the red force attack, the blue force will take fewer 
casualties by disrupting red force kill webs and ability to synchronize effects on the 
battlefield.  
2. Blue Force Lethality  
The second metamodel created from the Experiment 3 data assessed the blue force 
lethality. The measure of effectiveness for blue force lethality is the number of ZBDs that 
the blue force destroyed. Figure 34 below summarizes the model which was fit to design 
point averages.  
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Figure 34. Experiment 3 Blue Force Lethality Model 
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The metamodel of ZBD casualties should be interpreted as model of the blue force 
lethality. The model achieves an R-Square of 0.81, suggesting a reasonable fit to the data. 
At the bottom of Figure 34, the lack of normality in the residual plot is displayed. This 
outcome, similar to the previous survivability model, is due to the limitations in number of 
agents that can be killed in the scenario. However, as before, the model is built on the least 
square’s estimator, and therefore provides insight into the importance of different factors 
on scenario outcomes. The lethality model suggests that the most critical factors in order 
are: 
1. Number of UAS Waves 
2. Wave swarm size 
3. MAAW probability of kill 
4. OPF 1 class 2 probability of kill 
This outcome makes intuitive sense in the context of layering kill assets within an 
engagement area. More loitering munitions in the HAW-MAW-LAW construct, launched 
early in the battle begin to attrite the enemy force. By the time the enemy force makes 
landfall, if it is still combat effective, squads with their MAAWs can finish destroying the 
remaining force. This finding aligns with missile warfare findings by Hughes and Girrier 
(2018) that the side that “fires effectively first” will be more lethal in the battle.  
3. Blue Force Victory 
The third model created with data from Experiment 3 used logistic regression to 
examine the probability of victory in the scenario for the blue force based upon the different 
input parameters. The model was fit to the design point average outcomes. The measure of 
effectiveness was whether the red force was able to establish a blocking position on the 
piece of key terrain in the scenario. The model is summarized below in Figure 35.  
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Figure 35. Experiment 3 Blue Victory Model 
The victory metamodel suggests that there are a variety of requirements for blue to 
achieve victory. To assess those thresholds, a prediction profiler is used to examine the 
different parameter levels required for blue to win. Two potential outcomes are shown in 
Figures 36 and 37.  
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Figure 36. Experiment 3 Blue Victory Conditions Profiler 1 
Figure 36 uses the victory model to assess blue force requirements if the red force 
has both UAS and naval surface fire support. Based upon the model, under these 
conditions, if the blue force can engage with six waves of OPF 1 class 2 UAS, and each 
wave has a swarm size of three, then the estimated probability of victory is 0.88. This 
probability of victory is very favorable to the blue force commander. As seen in the above 
figure, this outcome is predicated under a UAS probability of kill of 0.65 and MAAW 
probability of kill of 0.5. Engagement distance appears to matter less than these factors in 
the model. It should be noted though that engagement distance has a large effect on 
survivability, as shown in Experiment 3’s model 1. If probabilities of kill greater than those 
shown in the profiler can be achieved, then a higher probability of victory is expected. 
Those probabilities were chosen in the profiler because they were conservative, and the 
author expects them to be achievable by a well-trained unit in combat conditions.  
 
Figure 37. Experiment 3 Blue Victory Conditions Profiler 2 
Figure 37 posits a scenario in which the red force does not have access to naval 
surface fire support or UAS. Under these conditions, the number of waves required and 
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probability of kill of a blue force OPF UAS can be reduced, while maintaining 
approximately the same probability of victory as in Figure 36. This trend is important 
because if the battalion and higher-level echelons above the blue force infantry company 
can remove the red force’s ability to achieve combined arms, the amount of combat power 
required at blue force company level can be greatly reduced. The reduction of risk to 
mission by removing the red force’s ability to synchronize combined arms is significant. 
Instead of six waves, the blue force company only requires five. Instead of a UAS 
probability of kill of 0.65, the new, reduced requirement is 0.5. These reduced requirements 
translate to fewer OPF systems being required and therefore a lighter logistical footprint.  
As technology improves, there is a future potential that swarm sizes could increase 
to four and probability of kill for an OPF 1 class 2 system increase to 0.9. A 0.9 probability 
of kill is approximately the probability of kill expected of a javelin missile. Under the 
assumption that an OPF 1 class 2 could maintain the same probability of kill, the model 
suggests a probability of victory of approximately 0.93. This outcome is shown below in 
Figure 38.  
 
Figure 38. Experiment 3 Blue Victory Conditions Profiler 3  
If the blue force can launch four UAS swarms of four systems with individual 
probability of kill of 0.9, this allows the blue force commander to strike with greater combat 
power earlier in the battle. In a littoral environment, this means more ZBDs sunk earlier, 
further out at sea. It is probable that catastrophic kills of ZBDs at sea lead to greater death 
than on land. This outcome is due to the higher probability that all red force infantry being 
transported on the ZBD are also killed in the UAS attack at sea. It is more difficult to egress 
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from a sinking ZBD at sea than a disabled one on land. Additionally, if an infantryman can 
escape from a burning ZBD at sea, he is most likely combat ineffective because he must 
be recovered and brought ashore. This recovery takes time and is unlikely in a dynamic 
amphibious assault. These qualitative mission planning factors combined with the 
quantitative factors of the model suggest that HAW-MAW-LAW and larger swarms lead 
to higher probabilities of victory for the blue force.  
To further examine the conditions required for blue victory, a partition tree was 
constructed based upon the mean probability of victory for each design point. The tree can 
be seen below in Figure 39. This method supports the findings in the previous model and 
amplifies several key points. 
 
Figure 39. Experiment 3 Blue Victory Partition Tree 
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The partition tree suggests that the number of waves and swarm size of each wave 
are the most critical factors in the blue force achieving victory. The first split in the tree is 
on the number of waves of UAS that the blue force has available. If the blue force has three 
or more waves, then, on average, it wins with a probability of 0.70. If it has less than three 
waves, then the probability of victory is only 0.08. This difference in victory probabilities 
is massive just based upon this one split in the tree. The second split in the tree is on swarm 
size. If the blue force has three or more UAS per wave, then the mean probability of victory 
is 0.92. If the blue force has less than three UAS per wave the probability of victory is only 
0.48. On the right side of the tree, the splits continue dividing on the number of waves of 
UAS the blue force can use in the battle. These continued splits suggest that there is non-
linearity in the number of available waves of UAS—as was seen in the regression profiler 
plots above. As the blue force has access to more waves, they gain significantly larger 
probabilities of victory. As would be expected, as blue crosses a certain threshold, it 
achieves overkill in its aggregate amount of combat power, i.e., its ability to kill the enemy. 
Beyond a certain point, in this specific scenario, adding more UAS will not provide much 
higher probabilities of victory. The partition tree suggests that this threshold is six waves 
of three or more OPF 1 class 2 UAS. This indicates that with 18 of these UAS the blue 
company achieves overmatch on the red company even when the red company has 
supporting arms.  
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VI. THESIS CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We are an elite institution of warriors and will remain so on my watch. 
—38th Commandant 
Chapter VI summarizes key findings from this research and provides a series of 
targeted recommendations for different billet holders and organizations across the Marine 
Corps. 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
1. Combat Modeling and Simulation 
Combat modeling and simulation using robust design of experiments enabled the 
efficient exploration of different factors related to victory or defeat in the examined 
scenario. The three experiments, in aggregate, enabled the comparison of different blue 
and red force actions on the scenario measures of effectiveness. The analysis of scenario 
outcomes allows clear and actionable recommendations to commanders to reduce risk to 
the force and risk to the mission. While the combat models themselves are not predictive, 
they allow a relative assessment to identify efficient allocations of resources to different 
modernization efforts.  
2. Metamodeling 
Metamodeling was conducted on the farmed datasets from the combat model. 
These metamodels used different statistical techniques to understand the model outcomes. 
Metamodels were created to examine all three primary measures of effectiveness. 
Recommendations from the models themselves can be found in the next section, research 
findings.  
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. Increasing Lethality 
The lethality of the blue force infantry company was measured in its ability to 
destroy red force ZBDs. The more lethal force was able to destroy more ZBDs earlier in 
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the battle. To achieve this, the blue company used both its direct fire kill assets, such as 
MAAW rockets and Javelin missiles, and loitering munitions, specifically OPF 1 class 2 
attack UAS. The ability of the company to mass loitering munitions can be considered as 
its “throw weight.” Throw weight was a metric used during the age of sail to calculate the 
fighting power of a ship. It meant how much weight of shot a ship could engage within a 
cannon salvo or broadside. A modern infantry company’s throw weight is very similar and 
can be thought of as how many loitering munitions it can engage with. From the 
metamodeling, several general trends emerge. 
1. More UAS in general lead to more lethality 
2. Bigger swarms of UAS in general lead to more lethality 
3. Fewer than 10 OPF 1 class 2 UAS being available to the blue force leads 
to significantly less lethality against the red force. 
4. More than 18 OPF 1 class 2 did not lead to significantly greater lethality, 
as the blue company ran out of targets. 
5. MAAWs and Javelin missiles are still important kill assets and can be 
critical if OPF systems are compromised or not available.  
6. OPF 1 class 1 systems are useful in small numbers once red force infantry 
disembarks from ZBDs. 
All missions, scenarios, and future operations will have different factors that require 
specific planning. From these above trends, however, there are several general 
recommendations that can be made for ordnance requirements before a company 
engagement.  
1. Each MAAW gunner must have no less than two rockets available. 
2. Each Javelin team must have no less than two missiles available. 
3. The blue company has between 10 and 18 OPF 1 class 2 available as the 
specific mission requires.  
4. Each infantry squad must have no less than two OPF 1 class 1 systems. 
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For comparison, a section of tanks with a combat load supporting an infantry 
company would have 80 main gun rounds to engage targets. If the probability of kill for 
each main gun round is assumed to be 0.25, then, on average, that section of tanks would 
be able to kill 20 targets. If the probability of kill for each OPF 1 class 2 system is assumed 
to be 0.90, then, on average, if the company has 18 OPF 1 class 2, it can destroy 16.2 
targets. While OPF systems do not provide a protected direct-fire platform, they have a 
significantly greater range and the ability to indirectly engage the enemy from cover. 
Additionally, it is probable that 18 OPF 1 class 2 systems are much lighter and require less 
sustainment than a section of tanks. It is unknown to the author exactly how much cubic 
space 18 future OPF systems will require; however, commanders should not underestimate 
OPF effectiveness and its importance in killing the enemy in a conventional fight with 
many unknowns. Commanders should strongly consider using additional cargo space to 
bring more OPF loitering munitions if space is available.  
While the modeled scenario focused on the company level, it would be expected 
that a Marine infantry company would be operating as part of a larger force, such as the 
MLR. Based upon the company level outcomes, several recommendations can be made to 
improve lethality at the company level by shaping actions at higher levels. These 
recommendations are specific to contesting a counter-lodgment force. If the enemy does 
not seek to land, then the scheme of maneuver at the MLR level should be different because 
it no longer needs to shape the battlefield to enable infantry company success. An example 
battle space shaping matrix is shown in Figure 40. The matrix is predicated on the infantry 
company not engaging amphibious shipping with OPF 1 class 2 UAS. It envisions a 
requirement for shaping fires against these targets by higher echelons.  
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Figure 40. Battlespace Shaping Matrix 
In general, the battlespace shaping matrix above advocates for initially destroying 
enemy air defense to enable friendly close air support and destroying naval surface fire 
support assets to reduce risk to anti-ship missiles. It then advocates for destroying UAS 
support systems as enemy shipping closes within the OPF heavy range. It is assumed for 
these purposes that the infantry battalion has OPF heavy systems able to destroy small 
ships and larger amphibious connectors such as LCACs. As the red force closes with land, 
OPF heavy should attrite connectors and UAS support nodes to reduce red’s transport, 
reconnaissance, and counter reconnaissance capabilities. Finally, as ZBDs disembark off 
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the red force amphibious ships, the infantry company can focus on the ZBDs and prevent 
the enemy from establishing a lodgment ashore.  
At the MLR and battalion level, the battlespace shaping matrix can be distilled into 
an attack guidance matrix, shown in Figure 41. The attack guidance matrix prioritizes 
different targets and matches weapon systems to them. If the MLR and battalion can attrite 
these key capabilities, the infantry company has a probability of being more successful in 
contesting an amphibious assault.  
 
Figure 41. Battalion Attack Guidance Matrix 
Finally, at the company level, the priorities of fire should align with Figure 42. UAS 
and fire support should be included first if future live-fire testing shows the efficacy of 
company organic OPF systems against these target sets. The author envisions an OPF 1 
class 2 system employed against the bridge of a ship. The shape charge explosion and 
corresponding spalling effect of fragmentation from an OPF 1 class 2 could be very deadly 
in confined shipboard spaces. Even an OPF 1 class 1 system could be effective against 
antennas and other sensor arrays by fragmentation damage. 
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Figure 42. Company Priorities of Fire 
If OPF systems are not available in the recommended numbers, different kill assets 
will be required at the company level to generate sufficient combat power. The Marine 
Corps should examine supporting infantry companies with Amphibious Combat Vehicles 
(ACVs). If the vehicles have 30mm cannons and javelins integrated as part of a remote 
weapon system, it is possible that sufficient combat power could be generated to offset not 
having enough OPF systems. Additionally, ACVs should be examined as a platform for 
transporting and launching OPF systems. The cargo space and C2 systems in an ACV could 
facilitate large numbers of OPF being employed in swarm tactics. Joint light tactical 
vehicles could also be potential platforms for increasing company level combat power.  
2. Improving Survivability 
Combat modeling conducted for this thesis indicates that the future battlefield will 
be a highly lethal place full of precision loitering munitions. The primary method of 
improving blue force survivability is increasing the blue force’s ability to destroy the red 
force before they make landfall by engaging with more UAS sooner. This trend should be 
seen as “use it or lose it.” If the blue force waits and attempts to achieve massed surprised 
fires, it is probable that they will be discovered by the red force and engaged. The individual 
detection probability of a red UAS may be relatively small. However, with the large 
numbers of UAS in a small space, the smaller probabilities of detection add up quickly. It 
cannot be assumed that even with camouflage in prepared positions, that the blue force will 
remain undetected by the red force. This may not be true at larger echelons. In an MLR 
sized battlespace, mass surprised fires take on a different character, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
At the company level, there are several characteristics that make survivability 
difficult. To contest an amphibious assault, a company must be close enough to the water 
69 
to employ its OPF systems. This fact means that there are only so many places a company 
can hide. If the enemy is seeking to make landfall, it is intent on committing a large amount 
of combat power supported by significant amounts of close air support and other fires. 
Because of this, even if the blue force won in the combat model, it often took large numbers 
of casualties. Marine Corps planners should plan for the possibility of large numbers of 
casualties in infantry units conducting EAB. More research should be done on this subject, 
examining how to conduct tactical combat casualty care in EAB and role 2 surgery to save 
Marine lives. Whenever a Marine platoon is discovered by a red UAS swarm, it can be 
engaged by the red force quickly and destroyed. The blue company may still win, however, 
because it is disaggregated and can still mass enough UAS from the company headquarters 
and other platoons.  
Small actions can be taken at the company level to increase survivability of key 
assets. In the scenario, blue javelin teams were often destroyed by red UAS as they are a 
high payoff target for the red force. Because they were grouped together in the combat 
model, one or two red UAS often killed both members of the team. To conduct a javelin 
battle drill, only one 0352 anti-tank missile Marine is required. The infantry company 
commander should consider disaggregating 0352s into hides before the amphibious assault 
takes place to increase the probability that at least one 0352 survives to conduct an anti-
tank guided missile battle drill. Once the enemy makes landfall or as required, the 0352s 
could move out of a hide and link up with their weapon system to engage enemy forces.  
The company headquarters and OPF 1 class 2 launchers should be behind and offset 
from the platoon defenses. By moving these assets away from potential enemy objectives, 
it is less likely that they will be detected and targeted. Dispersion is critical in this regard. 
Additionally, key target indicators of UAS capability should be hidden, if possible, to 
reduce the probability that OPF 1 class 2 launchers are detected and classified. The enemy 
will know and understand that OPF capability is a high payoff target for them, and act 
accordingly to find and destroy it.  
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3. Generating Victory 
To generate victory at the company level, the company commander must be enabled 
by the battalion to act. Permissive fire support coordination measures enable maneuver 
warfare. To start, the company should have a restricted operations zone (ROZ), or other 
fire support control measure (FSCM), which enables it to employ OPF with impunity. If 
the company must ask for permission every time it launches a UAS, latency will be too 
high, and opportunities missed. To enable OPF heavy to be employed by the battalion, an 
air corridor should be established, offset to the company engagement areas, to allow the 
battalion to provide shaping fires through the ROZ. If the corridor is not possible, the 
maximum altitude of the ROZ should be limited to the largest maximum ordnance of the 
81mm mortar targets the company will be firing in its ROZ plus a sufficient buffer distance. 
OPF heavy could then be flown over the top of the ROZ. In a communication denied 
environment, close coordination to turn on and off a ROZ, or route through a ROZ will be 
difficult. Passive, permissive measures should be examined as the standard for these future 
operations. An example ROZ is shown in Figure 43.  
 
Figure 43. Recommended Company ROZ 
Once the enemy enters the forward engagement area and conditions allow, the 
company should engage with as many OPF 1 class 2 systems as possible. If these systems 
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are shown to be efficacious against enemy shipping, shipping should be engaged. If not 
then, as soon as ZBDs disembark from the ship, the ZBDs should be engaged. The combat 
modeling and analysis conducted for this thesis demonstrates that ZBDs moving between 
three and five knots in the surf are highly vulnerable to loitering munitions. Conducting a 
top-down attack against a ZBD without cover or concealment could achieve a catastrophic 
kill where any infantry the ZBD is transporting are killed or rendered combat ineffective 
and the ZBD itself neutralized or destroyed. The future company commander should 
exploit the ZBDs vulnerability in the water and not allow it to reach the shore if possible. 
This concept is illustrated in Figure 44.  
 
Figure 44. Recommended Forward Engagement Area 
If any enemy forces are still able to make landfall, platoons can mass OPF 1 class 
1 systems against disembarked red infantry forces. The blue force should hold their direct 
fire weapon systems until their position is compromised or a decisive advantage is gained. 
By adding friction and attriting the enemy systems early in the battle, it is less likely that 
the enemy will be able to synchronize effects for a combined arms amphibious assault. 
Additionally, it is probable that the red force company leadership will be killed early in the 
battle, increasing the probability that the blue force wins. An example of this concept is 
shown in Figure 45.  
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Figure 45. Recommended Main Engagement Area 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Modeling and Simulation 
In the EAB research space, significant future research is required to examine the 
many different possible scenarios, force designs, and other factors that will influence the 
future fight. Future modeling and simulation efforts could take the following lines of 
efforts: 
• Anti-swarm modeling -- how will the blue force stop the red force swarms 
from locating and destroying key blue force capabilities before they can be 
used? This research did not model counter UAS technologies. 
• Electronic warfare modeling -- how will electronic attack and defense be 
used for the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance efforts in EAB? 
This research did not model electronic warfare as it stayed at the 
unclassified level. 
• Engineering modeling -- how will expeditionary engineering technologies 
enhance the survivability of the blue force?  
• Refinement of the current model -- as these emerging technologies are 
tested and TTPs refined, the base model used in this research can be 
updated with more accurate (even classified) numbers. Uncertainty still 
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exists, especially in the reconnaissance modeling. As fields of view, 
convolutional-neural net edge classification capabilities, and sensor 
specifications become clearer, these factors could be used to update the 
parameters of the model. 
• Use of a high-resolution model to see if the results from MANA-V are 
replicable in a different modeling environment. 
2. Wargaming 
To aid in qualitative analysis, wargaming can be conducted for both exploratory 
and educational purposes. The outputs of this thesis work can be used for the following 
purposes: 
• To help company and battalion staffs in understanding the future 
operational environment and explore possible future TTPs associated with 
the OPF systems.  
• To aid in understanding force requirements and adjudication of an MLR 
level wargame 
• To assist the red cell in identifying potential weaknesses in the blue force 
kill web that could be exploited by enemy forces to break the blue system. 
3. Live and Live-Fire Experimentation 
Both live and live-fire experimentation is required to examine future operational 
environments and validate the assumptions of this thesis work. The scenario examined in 
this thesis (and subsets of it) could be tested in both live experimentation and eventually 
live-fire experimentation in some sort of live-fire range. This testing could be iterative and 
take the following steps: 
• Development and testing of OPF 1 class 1 and 2 systems against light 
armored targets, ship sensor arrays, and other targets such as ship-to-shore 
connectors. 
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• Development and testing of OPF launch battle drills with the company 
headquarters element. 
• Development and testing of OPF launch battle drills with the company 
headquarters and squad UAS operators to examine the echeloning of fires 
under a disaggregated company HAW-MAW-LAW employment concept. 
• Full testing of a live fire disaggregated company range with direct and 
indirect fire weapons systems integrated with OPF. 
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APPENDIX A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A. 2 × 2 FULL FACTORIAL 





















3 3 0.56 0.28 0.66 9.4 142 
1 2 0.51 0.3 0.9 10.4 213 
1 5 0.58 0.53 0.85 7.1 87 
2 1 0.4 0.55 0 4.1 0 
3 6 0.8 0.6 0.39 7.4 229 
3 2 0.78 0.2 0.59 5.1 22 
2 7 0.6 0.47 0.48 11.4 158 
4 4 0.75 0.25 0.55 6.8 5 
3 10 0.84 0.7 0.33 8.1 33 
4 10 0.55 0.26 0.47 15 196 
4 3 0.66 0.11 0.51 3.5 164 
4 4 0.7 0.5 0.43 14 202 
2 2 0.91 0.63 0.21 1.2 44 
2 8 0.48 0.66 0.78 0.5 224 
4 1 0.5 0.17 0.08 6.1 207 
3 9 0.63 0.37 0.36 13.7 49 
4 1 0.63 0.54 0.75 2.8 76 
4 8 0.83 0.22 0.7 3.1 136 
4 10 0.45 0.58 0.37 8.4 16 
1 4 0.71 0.1 0.19 2.5 109 
2 9 0.85 0.13 0.31 7.8 65 
3 6 0.61 0.67 0.89 4.5 175 
4 3 0.49 0.59 0.45 9.1 93 
3 5 0.42 0.33 0.29 12.4 27 
1 5 0.76 0.43 0.02 14.7 191 
1 7 0.57 0.29 0.41 12.7 38 
3 5 0.67 0.18 0.11 6.4 147 
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3 9 0.79 0.45 0.25 4.8 82 
1 7 0.54 0.56 0.14 2.1 235 
1 2 0.81 0.65 0.61 5.8 11 
1 7 0.53 0.21 0.16 0.8 104 
4 4 0.74 0.44 0.74 14.3 71 
4 10 0.89 0.36 0.03 1.5 169 
2 4 0.46 0.4 0.57 11 153 
2 6 0.43 0.51 0.06 9.7 185 
1 9 0.88 0.62 0.71 11.7 120 
1 6 0.86 0.15 0.53 12 55 
1 1 0.65 0.48 0.12 13 115 
3 1 0.93 0.35 0.67 13.4 180 
2 3 0.94 0.32 0.63 3.8 218 
2 8 0.41 0.24 0.81 5.4 125 
3 3 0.9 0.69 0.27 10.1 98 
1 8 0.73 0.14 0.84 8.7 60 
2 5 0.95 0.41 0.23 10.7 240 
2 7 0.69 0.39 0.8 1.8 131 
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1 9 0.88 0.62 0.71 11.7 120 
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1 1 0.65 0.48 0.12 13 115 
3 1 0.93 0.35 0.67 13.4 180 
2 3 0.94 0.32 0.63 3.8 218 
2 8 0.41 0.24 0.81 5.4 125 
3 3 0.9 0.69 0.27 10.1 98 
1 8 0.73 0.14 0.84 8.7 60 
2 5 0.95 0.41 0.23 10.7 240 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL MODELING 
During the analysis phase of the research, the author created over 30 different 
metamodels to examine the data. Not all models made it into the body of this thesis, and 
some are included here for readers. 
The first additional model is a partition tree fit to the raw Experiment 3 outputs. 
The overall tree is shown n Figure 46. Figure 47 highlights the importance of latency. As 
latency increases in the network there is great risk to force, i.e., more blue force casualties.  
 
Figure 46. Experiment 3 Blue Force Survivability Partition Tree  
 
Figure 47. Latency Effect on Survivability 
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